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SUPPLEMENT TO POOL MEMORANDUM
To:

Justice Powell

May 12, 1987

From:

Ronald

Re:

No. 86-1552, Department of Navy v. Egan

The Navy hired Egan as a laborer at a nuclear submarine
facility.

On his

job application,

Egan noted that he had been

convicted for assault and car-rying a pistol.
he has an alcohol problem~

He improperly failed to note two oth-

'
er co p_yj ctions for carrying a loaded
firearm.

covered

these

clearance.

other

He also noted that

convictions,

it

When the Navy dis-

revoked

Egan's

security

Because there were no jobs available at the facility

that did not require a security clearance, Egan was discharged.

2•

Egan appealed (eventually)
tion Board

(MSPB).

to the Merit Systems Protec-

MSPB consolidated this

case with others to

decide whether it has power to review the revocation of a security clearance.

MSPB decided that it could determine whether the

Navy actually required a

clearance

for

the

job in question and

whether the Navy actually had r~voked the clearance.

But it de-

cided that it could not review the Navy's decision to revoke the
clearance.

v

On appeal, CAFed reversed.

5 U.S.C.

MSPB review of all agency personnel actions.
tion _for security clearances.

§7512 provides for
There is no excep-

Accordingly, MSPB should have re-

viewed this decision.

CAFed noted that Congress has

the

interest

strong

government

in

end, Congress enacted §7532, that~

national

recognized

security.

To

that

lows suspension of a security

clearance (without MSPB re~iew) when it is "necessary in the interests of national security."
in this case.

Accordingly,

The Navy did not act under §7532

it is bound by t ~ e normal §7512 pro-

cedures, including MSPB review.
;

The ~
troublesome.

rgues

persuasively

that

CAFed's

is

§7532 provides for removal only if the Navy deter/I

mines,

analysis

after a hearing,

ests of national security.

---

~,

that removal is necessary in the interThis is a much stricter standard than

the standard for granting a security clearance, if it is "clearly

~----~--------

consistent with the interests of national security."
enough to see how giving Egan a
sistent with

the

interests

clearance

of national

is not

security."

It is easy

"clearly conBut CAFed's

result indicates that Egan can keep his . clearance until the Navy

3.

demonstrates that it is "necessary in the interests of national
Such a decision infringes the

security" to revoke the clearance.
President's

unbridled

discretion

to

grant

and

revoke

security

clearances.
Of course,
the

Congress'

important interests

creation of the MSPB demonstrates

in unbi~sed

versely affect federal employees.
clearly wrong.

On the other hand,

review of actions

that ad-

Thus, CAFed's decision is not
the Court

regularly has

re-

fused to apply relatively clear statutory language in a way that
might compromise the efficiency of the armed forces.

I think the

SG's _argument is persuasive enough to merit review by this Court.
I

note that there is no conflict in the CAs,

but I

gather that

all such cases go to ~AFed; accordingly there can be no conflict.

---

~=--- --

I recommend GRANT.
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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM
May 21, 1987 Conference
List 1, Sheet 2
No. 86-1552-CFX
DEPT. OF NAVY (wants no
review of security
clearance
denials/revocations)

Cert to CAFed (Newman, Swygert
[CA7), Markey-;--f~-Y:- [dis.))

v.
THOMAS E. EGAN

(employee who lost
security clearance)

1.

SUMMARY:

Federal / Civil

Timely

Petr argues that the CAFed erred in per-

mitting the Board to review decisions to deny security clearance.
2.

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW:

· On Nov.

29,

1981,

-

2 -

resp was appointed to a position of laborer at a Naval submarine
facility and then,

on Apr.

18, 1982, assigned to that of labor

leader, a position with access to secret or confidential informa tion.

A condition for the retention of resp's employment was his

satisfactory completion of security reports.
resp's initial appointment,

Over a year after

the Director of Naval Civilian Per-

sonnel Command (NCPC) issued a notice of intention to deny/revoke
resp's security clearance.

The reason for this action was resp's

prior convictions for assault and carrying a pistol

(apparently

listed on his job application), his failure to list in his application two other convictions for carrying a loaded firearm,
his alcohol problem (also initially documented by resp).
written reply to this notice,

resp stated

(1)

and
In a

that he had not

listed the two convictions either because they had been dismissed
or he had not been found guilty of them and because they were
outside

the

period

stated

on

the

application,

(2)

that,

with

respect to the other two convictions, he had paid his "debt" to
society for them, and (3) that alcohol had not been a problem for
him for more

than three years.

explanation as

adequate and

The NCPC did not accept

revoked

resp' s

this

security clearance.

Because security clearance was a mandatory condition for resp's
job

( he

worked

on

and

around

nuclear

submarines)

and

because

transfer to a nonsecurity position was not feasible at the facility, resp was removed from his position.
Resp
(Board),

which

appealed
reversed

to
the

the

Merit

removal

Systems
decision.

Protection
The

Board

presiding

official (PO) stated that the agency must set forth the criteria

~

- 3 -

according to which a security clearance is granted or denied and
explain

how

these

criteria

are

related

to

national

security.

Petr had set forth no such criteria or explanation, and so it was
impossible

to

determine

whether

its

decision

was

reasonable.

Petr also failed to present evidence that it had weighed conscientiously

the

circumstances

of

resp's

misconduct

against

the

interests in national security and to heed the PO'S warning about
the deficiencies in its evidence and the problem in relying upon
conclusory statements.
The
other

cases

"test"

case

Board itself
presented a
and

in

turn

similar

solicited amicus

reversed the

issue,

the

briefs

Board stated that it had no authority to

on

(Because

PO.

Board made
the

this

issues.)

a

The

review petr's stated

reasons for the security clearance determination.

Its review was

limited

of

to

the

following:

"(1)

the

requirement

a

security

clearance for the position in question; (2) the loss or denial of
the security clearance; (3) and the granting of minimal due process protection to the employee."

Ptn. App. 7a.

This due process

suggested that an employee should have notice of the denial or
revocation, a statement of the reasons for it, and an opportunity
to respond.

Moreover, the Board could not order reinstatement of

a security clearance; rather,

the appropriate remedy,

if an em-

ployee were denied due process, would be to reverse the action
and to order the agency to put the employee back on a pay status.
The agency could then reinstate the removal after supplying the
employee with the due process.

In resp's case, the correct pro-

cedures mandated by due process had been followed.

- 4 The CAFed vacated and remanded.

It first observed that

5 U.S.C. §7532 ("the head of an agency may suspend without pay an
employee of his agency when he considers that action necessary in
the interests of national security" [full text on Ptn. App. 73a74a]), which excludes Board review,
for

is not the exclusive basis

removal on national security grounds and,

petr's stated basis in this case.

in fact,

was not

Rather, resp was removed pur-

suant to §§7512 and 7513 ("an agency may take an action covered
by this subchapter against an employee only for
will promote the efficiency of the service"
App.

72a-73a]),

which

provide

for

the

such cause as

[full text in Ptn.

standard

Board

review.

There is nothing in §7532 stating that it preempts §7513 procedures in national security cases; it is up to the agency to select the appropriate procedure for a particular case.
The CAFed then considered the Board's proper scope of
review in this case.
authority to
determination.

The Board was wrong to think that it had no

review petr's

reasons

for

the

security clearance

§7701(c)(l)(B) provides that the Board will de-

termine whether an agency's decision is supported by a preponderance

of

the

evidence,

and

no

exception

is

made

for

security

clearance decisions (unless, of course, the removal is based on
§7532).

See Hoska v. United States Dept. of Army, 677 F.2d 131

(CADC 1982).
which a

The Board relied upon Exec. Order No. 10,450 under

"head of each department and agency of the government

shall be responsible for establishing and maintaining within his
department

or

agency

an

effective

program

to

insure

that

the

employment and retention in employment of any civilian officer or

.

'

-

5 -

employee within the department or agency is clearly consistent
with the interests of national security"

[full text,

Ptn. App.

This Order, which establishes responsibilities in the

75a-86a].

Executive Branch, has nothing to do with appellate review of an
agency's decisions as to security clearance.
The

Board acknowledges

that,

in general,

it has

the

authority to review the merits of a case, including the underlying reasons on which an adverse action was based.
exception

for

military assignments,

see

There is an

Zimmerman v.

Dept.

of

Army, 755 F.2d 156 (CAFed 1985); Buriani v. Dept. of Air Force,
777 F.2d 674 (CAFed 1985), criminal convictions, and bar decertifications, but these cases are not relevant here: security clearances
law

on

involve employees in military and civilian agencies;
criminal

convictions

and

bar

decertifications

the

prevents

collateral attacks on other tribunals--here petr wants to insulate its decision from appellate review.
that a

review of a

While the Board thought

security clearance decision would bring to

light all sorts of sensitive information, no such materials were
asserted to be relevant in resp's case (and petr always has the
option of proceeding under §7532 if it is worried about disclosing

such materials).

under

§7512

regulations

and

Because

according

(i.e.,

to

deliberate

resp' s
specific
false

removal

was

criteria

statement

in

[see

"for

cause"

petr's

own

regulation,

Ptn. App. 18a] ), the Board "is capable of reviewing the record to
decide if the agency has established by appropriate standard that
the employee should be denied security clearance."

In addition,

the Board also can evaluate the nexus between the criteria set

...

-

6 -

out by petr's regulations and an employee's ability to safeguard
classified information (such a determination is no different from
other nexus exami nations made by the Boa rd) .

Thus,

the Boa rd

here should make a full review of petr's action as it would any
other agency action taken pursuant to §7512.
The CAFed then noted that the Board's decision would
produce

the

national

anomalous

security

result

reasons

of

giving

pursuant

to

employees

§7512

less

removed
process

for
than

those removed pursuant to §7532, where a full evidentiary hearing
is required, see §7532(c)(3)(C).
process

is

a

departure

from

Indeed, the Board's minimum due
the

statutorily

mandated

post-

termination hearing provided in S7701(a)(l) and the constitutional protection from a deprivation of a liberty or property interest,

see Arnett v.

Kennedy,

416 U.S. 134 (1974).

A right to a

full hearing is particularly significant in a security clearance
case.

For the record of information used to deny security clear-

ance will make it difficult for resp to get other govt employment
and

even

private

transgressions

may

sector

employment.

justify his

Although

removal,

the

merits

actions have not yet been reviewed by the Board.
refusing to review an agency's

reasons for

resp's
of

alleged
petr's

"The Board, by

refusal of security

clearance, denies to those federal employees the minimal opportunity to correct agency error, or to be protected from specious,
arbitrary, or discriminatory actions."

Ptn. App. 22a.

Finally, the CAFed noted that the question of the remedies available to petr if the Board orders resp's reinstatement
is not ripe.

On remand, the Board may well affirm petr's deci-

.

'

-

s ion to

removal

resp.

7 -

The problem partly has been created by

petr which took over 15 mos. to investigate resp (whose criminal
past, after all, was listed on his employment form).

The Board

will not substitute its judgment for that of petr or other agencies on the security clearance matter, but will function only as
a typical appellate tribunal, as it does in other cases.
In a long (and somewhat rambling) dissent, C.J. Markey
first

observed

that

resp was

nothing

more

than

a

conditional

employee who did not satisfy the condition precedent to his job.
(In a long footnote, he pointed out an anomaly that results from
this

case:

because petr hired

resp before

conducting the

full

review, its security decision will be subject to Board review; if
resp' s

security

started working,

clearance matter

had been decided

before

resp

denial of employment on the basis of security

clearance would never have been subject to Board review.

Thus,

agencies might be on notice no longer to hire probationary employees.

He also points out that resp did not avail himself of

an appeal process provided by petr.)
Moreover,

there is no evidence that officials of petr

"arbitrarily" removed resp.

Due process does not require a full

evidentiary hearing to review the action against resp, especially
where there is no dispute with respect to any material fact.

If

the majority's evaluation is allowed to stand, the discretion to
grant or to deny a security clearance, given by Exec. Order No.
10450 to an agency's head, will now be in the hands of the Board,
which has no institutional competence to make such a decision.
The question is not what is within the Board's jurisdiction, but

..

-

8 -

what is the scope of that jurisdiction.

"Congress has not sig-

nalled any intent that MSPB should use the

jurisdiction it was

granted as authority to inject itself into that sensitive area
committed to the Executive branch."

Ptn. App. 34a.

This case is

like Zimmerman and Buriani where employees were denied continued
civilian employment because of unreviewable military decisions.
In addition,
here.

there is a separation of powers problem

Who receives a security clearance is a matter assigned to

the Executive Branch.

"The majority does not tell us why an MSPB

presiding official, or MSPB itself,

is better, or even equally,

qualified to make that judgment than are the responsible military
officials."

Ptn. App.

39a.

Finally, C.J. Markey stated that

the decision below would produce an absurd result: despite resp's
criminal

record and history of alcohol dependence,

forced to grant him security clearance.

petr may be

The Board has not estab-

lished any set criteria for petr to apply in determining whether
to grant or to deny a clearance.
3.

CONTENTIONS:

determine whether an

The SG first argues that the power to

individual

is

sufficiently trustworthy to

occupy an executive branch position is in the President's hands.
Granting

a

security

executive discretion.

clearance
It

is

requires
possible

relied upon in making such a decision,
them.

This decision,

future behavior,

which attempts

an

affirmative

to specify some

act

of

factors

but not to list all of
to predict an employee's

is subjective in nature and "it is not reason-

ably possible for an outside,
stance of such a judgment.

11

inexpert body to review the sub-

Brief 11.

This Court has recognized

~

-

9 -

that, as to employees in sensitive positions,

such decisions as

to security clearance should be in the hands of an agency head.
Cole v. Young, 351 U.S. 536 (1956).
form Act of 1978 was enacted,

When the Civil Service Re-

there never had been a case

in

which a denial of security clearance was reviewed on the merits.
(The SG admits in a footnote that there were cases dealing with
review on the merits of the security clearance revocation of govt
contractors.

S e e , ~ , Gayer v. Schlesinger, 490 F.2d 740 (CADC

1973).)
The CAFed is wrong in its conclusion that §§7512 and
7513 permit a

review of a denial of security clearance simply

because this denial leads to a removal.
iani.

See Zimmerman and Bur-

The legislative history of the Act does not indicate that

Congress intended to alter the settled law that denials of security clearance are not subject to substantive review.
congressional

intent

from

congressional

silence

is

To find
misplaced

especially with respect to decisions that are inherently discretionary in nature and involving all sorts of intelligence matters.

The

§7701(c)(l)(B)
they

are

preponderance
is

of

ill-suited to

affirmative

against the employee.

decisions

the

evidence

standard

under

judge

such determinations,

where

every

doubt

is

for

resolved

Although the CAFed argues to the contrary,

the Board will be second-guessing agency determinations in the
full

evidentiary

hearing

provided

by

§7701

(this

already

has

happened in some cases).
Moreover,

the

CAFed

also

errs

in

relying

upon

the

availability of §7532, which is a drastic remedy not appropriate

- 10 for every denial

of security clearance.

§7532

requires an af-

firmative determination by the head of an agency that the removal
is

in

the

interests

security clearance,
consistent

with

of

national

security.

by contrast,

the

interests

(notice,

granting

occurs only if it is

of

agency cannot make such a finding,
portant protections

The

national

of

a

"clearly

security."

If

the

the employee has several im-

opportunity to be

heard),

but

not

the right to a review of the underlying security determination.
Finally,
three reasons:
was

a

( there

test
is a

the SG argues that review is appropriate for

(1) this is the dispositive case on the issue and

case;
risk

( 2)

national

security

interests

are

involved

sensitive material will be brought to light);

and (3) this case involves numerous decisions by agencies (200 by
petr this year).
In a five-page brief,

resp simply notes that,

is worried about national security,
under §7532 and that

if petr

then it can remove employees

resp was not a probationary employee

(and

thus entitled to the full protections of Board review).
In a longer brief, amicus Bogdanowicz (an individual in
resp's

position and

Employees)

points

represented by American Federation of Govt

out

that

the

SG

ignores

the

Hoska

decision,

where the CADC noted that the Board could review an underlying
basis for a security clearance revocation in an adverse personnel
action.

Moreover,

the

SG ignores

review process an employee,

the

like resp,

fact

that

in petr's own

has no opportunity for a

hearing to challenge the grounds for a security clearance revocation.

The SG makes much of the "subjective" nature of the secu-

~

- 11 rity clearance decision and of the Board's lack of suitability to
review it.
factual

The Board, however,

matters

(~,

did

simply is being asked to review

resp

actually commit

the

crimes'?).

The SG also is misleading when he states that there is no history
of judicial review of security clearance denials.
Schlesinger, supra (govt contractor employees).

See Gayer v.

Moreover, petr's

property interest in his job and liberty interest are at stake.
The hearing simply gives resp a chance to clear his name.
The SG is wrong to suggest that there is no statutory
authority for the Board's review in such cases: there is specific
provision of §7513(a) that does not exclude this class of cases.
And

the

Moreover,

SG

downplays

the

availability

of

§7532

to

the

Govt.

the SG's position that §§7512 and 7513 provide for a

review of removal but not for the agency action leading to removal is illogical, for one can examine the removal only by looking
at the facts allegedly supporting the denial of a security clearance.

The SG never raised the question of the standard of proof

of §7701(c)(l)(B) below.
4.

DISCUSSION:

This is a "test" case that potentially

affects a large number of other cases and that presents the rather sensitive issue of national security clearance.
however,

the

CAFed

has

responded

adequately

to

In my view,
the

arguments

raised by the SG: the statutory language of §§7512 and 7513 makes
no exception for removals based on security clearance revocation;
the

Exe cu ti ve

Order

does

not

deal

with

appe 11 ate

review;

the

review here primarily would consist of an examination of factual
matters; by the Board's decision resp is placed in the odd posi-

- 12 tion of not being entitled to a hearing (although he would have
one under §7532); and the issue of what petr must do is not ripe-the Board may conclude on
missed.

remand that

resp was properly dis-

And there is the precedent of Hoska, whose approach is

consistent with the CAFed's.
There are some disturbing points in the CAFed's conclusion, however.

~s C.J. Markey points out, agencies may be dis-

couraged from taking on employees before a security clearance has
been run

( on the other hand,

perhaps pet r

is to blame

in not

speeding up the security check while employees are still on probationary status).
situation,

Although this case does not present such a

there at least is the possibility that Board review

will force agencies to disclose sensitive material (in such situations, however, the agency has the recourse of §7532).

And the

reasoning of cases like Zimmerman, where the condition of a civilian's job with the Army was continued membership in an Army
Reserve Unit (which she lost), could be extended here.

Just as

the Board had no jurisdiction to examine military assignments or
transfers, 755 F.2d, at 156, which were job conditions, concerns
about potential interference with executive decision-making (particularly on military intelligence matters) would counsel against
Board review of security clearance matters.
5.

RECOMMENDATION:

I recommend a denial.

There is a response and an amicus brief.
May 12, 1987

Fanto

opn in petn

